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Part I
Early History of the Submarine

A

lthough the idea of a submersible boat dates back at least to the early
seventeenth century, and a number of efforts to perfect such a vessel had
occurred over the subsequent years, it was not until the latter part of the
eighteenth century that realistic attempts began to be made in this respect.
During the American Revolution David Bushnell devised a one-man
submersible known as the American Turtle. Its several attacks against British
warships were, for one reason or another, all unsuccessful.! Then in 1797 Robert
Fulton, who had been demonstrating his version ofthe submersible to the French
Navy, submitted a proposal to the French Directory for the construction and
the use by his "Nautulus Company" of a submarine against the ships of the
British Navy. Paragraph Six of that proposal stated?
And whereas fire Ships or other unusual means of destroying Navies are
Considered Contrary to the Laws of war, and persons taken in such enterprises
are liable to Suffer death, it will be an object of Safety if the Directory give the
Nautulus Company Commissions Specifying that all persons taken in the Nautulus
or Submarine Expeditio/l Shall be treated as Prisoners of War, And in Case of
Violence being offered the Government will Retaliate on the British Prisoners in
a four fold degree.
It can thus be seen that even in its earliest form, and even when it was to be
directed solely against warships, the submarine was a controversial weapon.
Fulton was unable to sell his idea to the French Government. Subsequendy, he
was equally unsuccessful in selling it to the British. 3
From the very beginning of the idea of a vessel that would travel under the
water instead of on the water, it was accepted that if it could be successfully
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developed it would be an asset to small nations, nations which could not afford
large standing navies. It was assumed that, because ofits anticipated short range,
it would be used primarily for coastal defense. It is, therefore, not surprising to
find that during the American Civil War the Confederacy developed and built
this type ofvessel to be used against the blockading warships ofthe Union Navy. 4
It was called a David and altogether the Confederate Navy probably constructed
more than a dozen of them. It was not truly a submersible, because, being
propelled by a steam engine, it had to have a constant source ofair. Accordingly,
it moved with its deck awash and an open hatch-not exacdy a recommended
method for safe navigation, and one which resulted in a number of sinkings
during its trials, with the loss of most of the members of the crews. However,
on October 5, 1863, one of these boats attacked and damaged the U.S.S. New
Ironsides. 5 The Confederates also built a true submersible, called the Hunley,
propelled by eight members of the crew turning a crankshaft which ran down
the center for most of the length of the vessel and which was connected to a
propeller. Its claim to fame is that on February 17, 1864 it sank the U.S.S.
Housatonic-and itself! It may be said that the David and the Hunley ushered in the
era of the submarine in warfare--even though at this point the Confederate
6
Navy appeared to lose interest in submersibles.
In the quarter century which followed, numerous other inventions were
being developed, and tested, in various countries, particularly in France, a
country which had early exhibited great interest in such a weapon, even though
it had rejected Fulton's proposal. The first really successful submersible, the
forerunner of the submarine of today, was built by John P. Holland, an
Irish-American who, after he had constructed several models, succeeded in
selling the latest version of the Holland to the United States Navy in 1900, the
first that it had acquired? At that same period both the United States Navy and
the Royal Navy placed orders with Holland for the construction and delivery
of additional submarines; while a number of continental nations were placing
similar orders with Holland and other inventors. Even Admiral von Tirpitz,
head of the German Navy, was eventually convinced that the submarine was
8
no longer solely a weapon of coastal defense.

The 1899 Hague Peace Conference
When, on December 30, 1898, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofImperial
Russia issued its proposed agenda for the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, one
item thereof stated: 9
4. Prohibition of the use in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo-boats or
of other engines of destruction of the same nature;
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When the matter was discussed in the Second Subcommission of the First
Commission of the Conference on May 31, 1899, the German representative
indicated that "if all the other governments agreed not to adopt vessels of this
kind, Germany wouldjoin in this understanding"; and the Italian and Japanese
delegates concurred in that statement; the United States delegate indicated that
his Government "wishes to preserve full liberty ... to use submarine torpedo
boats or not"; the delegate of Austria-Hungary gave his personal opinion that
"this new invention ... may be used for the defense of ports and roadsteads and
render very important services"; the French delegate stated that "the submarine
torpedo [boat] has an eminendy defensive purpose, and that the right to use it
should therefore not be taken from a country"; the British delegate thought that
"his country would consent to the prohibition in question ifall the great Powers
were agreed on this point. It would concern itselflitde as to what decision the
smaller countries reached"; the Dutch delegate and the delegate of Sweden and
Norway believed that "the submarine torpedo Jboat] is a weapon of the weak,
and does not think its use can be prohibited.,,1
In his report the Rapporteur of the Subcommission said11
After an exchange of personal views on the question of submarine torpedo boats
which enabled several delegates . . . to formulate very clear and precise ideas
regarding the future of this weapon, it is shown that, according to the declarations
made by a majority of the delegates, a prohibition of the boats in question must
be considered as very unlikely, at least for the time being.
His prognostication was confirmed when a vote on the proposal to ban the
submarine was taken in the First Commission and resulted in five votes (Belgium,
Bulgaria, Greece, Persia, and Siam) for the prohibition with reservations; five
votes (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Rumania) for the prohibition
on condition of unanimity; and nine votes (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the United
12
States) in the negative. Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland abstained. That ended
all efforts to ban the submarine at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. It should
be borne in mind that at this point in time most naval experts still considered
that the submarine was a weapon to be used for coastal defense, particularly by
the smaller and weaker nations which did not have strong navies. 13 Litde or no
consideration was given to the fact that the submarine might be valuable as a
commerce destroyer and on the high seas. Moreover, having failed to ban the
submarine, inexplicably, no attempt was made to obtain even minimum
. .
.
.
14
restnctlOns on Its operatIons.
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The 1907 Hague Peace Conference
During the period between the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
the major international event in the military area was the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-1905). No submarines participated in this conflict but, as one author has
pointed out, even a few Russian short-range submarines could have done enough
damage to the Japanese to have caused the latter to lift the blockade of Port Arthur
and even a few ofthe longer-ranged ones could have effectively impeded the landing
1S
ofJapanese troops in Korea. At that time, however, neither Japan nor Russia had
any submarines in their navies. That situation would soon change. 16
The Russian agenda for the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference called for
the "framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs of maritime
warfare," but contained no specific mention of the submarine. 17 When the
Fourth Commission of that Conference met for the first time on June 24, 1907,
its President, de Martens of Russia, said: "We must now do for naval warfare
what the Second Commission of the last Peace Conference did for land
warfare."lS While the Conference did draft a number of conventions with
respect to war at sea, some good and some not so good, the possibility of drafting
rules with respect to the use of submarines was not even a subject of discussion.
Although there is a tendency on the part of writers to refer to the inability of
both of those Hague Peace Conferences to reach agreement on restrictions on
the use ofsubmarines, 19 the present author could find only one passing reference
to the subject in the proceedings of the 1907 Conference. During the lengthy
discussion of the United States proposal to exemi6t all private property from
capture or seizure at sea the Belgian delegate said:
A torpedo-boat or a submarine can annihilate in a few moments a magnificent
vessel representing an enormous ouday and a thousand lives. In 1899 Russia
proposed that the employment of such engines of destruction be given up, just as
the poisoning ofarms and of springs had been prohibited, and most of the Powers
seemed ready to adhere to the proposal provided it were accepted unanimously.
But unfortunately I do not now see any indication among us of such an idea.

No further mention ofsubmarines could be found. It will, however, be appropriate
to point out that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VI provided that if
an enemy merchant ship were to be destroyed "provision must be made for the
safety of the persons on board as well as the security of the ship's papers.,,21

1909 Declaration of London
Article I of this Declaration stated that "the rules contained in the following
Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of
internationallaw.,,22 As the Declaration was intended to be all-inclusive insofar
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as restrictions on maritime trade during the course of a war were concerned and
as it contained no special rules with respect to submarines, it must be assumed
that there were at that time still no such rules?3 That being the case, submarines
would be bound by the general rules applicable to all warships. Customary
international law prescribed that, while a warship could be attacked without
warning, a merchant vessel was a noncombatant which could only be attacked
after warning and which could only be sunk under exceptional circumstances'
and then only after the safety of the passengers and crew had been assured?4
Although the then Lieutenant Rickover wrote in 1935 that "[i]n its official
correspondence with the United States the German government appears not to
have questioned the American contention that the rules of international law
governing surface men-of-war applied also to the submarine,,,25 during World
War I Germany actually did take issue with this conclusion. She contended that
she had chosen to use "a new weapon, the use of which had not yet been
regulated by international law and, in doing so, could not and did not violate
any existing rules but only took into account the peculiarity of this new weapon,
the submarine boat.,,26 Contrariwise, Lauterpacht took the position that "[t]he
novelty of a weapon does not itself carry with it a legitimate claim to a change
in the existing rules ofwar.,,27 Strange to relate, in a message ofJuly 18, 1916
to the British Ambassador in Washington, the British Foreign Office said: "The
first point to be established is that international law ought not to transfer without
modification to submarines, rules and regulations which work fairly well as
..c:
regarcis suuace
vesseIs. ,,28
It was during the immediate pre-World War I period that Great Britain made
a decision which was to have far-reaching consequences with respect to the use
of the submarine as a commerce destroyer and the disregarding of the
requirements of warning and of assuring the safety of the passengers and crew.
On March 26, 1913 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
announced in Parliament the intention of the British Government to arm its
merchantmen, at the same time asserting that the armaments would be stricdy
defensive and would not change the status of these vessels as noncombatant
merchant ships, to be distinguished from converted armed merchant cruisers?9
As we shall see, this decision had serious consequences in both World Wars,
one being the so-called "unrestricted submarine warfare" and the subsequent
controversy as to whether the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
Protocol are still binding law.

Part II
World War 1(1914-1918)

In World War I the inadequacy of the law of naval warfare with respect to
the protection of merchant vessels proved to be a matter of prime importance
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for both belligerents and neutrals. It may well be said that while the American
Civil War was the beginning of the era of the submarine, it only received full
recognition as a dangerous--and controversial-naval weapon system during
World War 1.
On August 6, 1914, just a few days after the outbreak of World War I,
Secretary of State Bryan sent a circular message to the belligerents asking each
if it would be "willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by
the Declaration ofLondon of1909 shall be applicable during the present conflict
in Europe.,,30 Most of the belligerents, including Germany, indicated that they
would comply with the rules set forth in that Declaration, subject to reciprocity.
However, Great Britain's decision to adopt these rules was made "subject to
certain modifications and additions which they adjudge indispensable to the
efficient conduct of their naval operations.,,31 As a result of the British position,
32
the United States withdrew its suggestion. Primary among these British
"modifications and additions" was a vast increase in the list of contraband
items?3 Historically, an enemy merchant ship was a noncombatant which could
be stopped, visited, and searched in order to examine her papers and to determine
whether she was carrying contraband, and captured if found to be carrying
contraband, but which could not be attacked, nor destroyed, except under
specific and limited circumstances--and then only after the safety of the persons
aboard had been assured. The lifeboats were not considered to be a place of
safety unless the weather was moderate and land was within a reasonable distance,
or another vessel was available which could take the crew and passengers of the
doomed vessel aboard. For some months after the outbreak of World War I
German submarines were used almost exclusively in the capacity of warship
against warship?4 The few merchantmen which were sunk by German
submarines during this period had suffered their fate in strict accordance with
the customary law of naval warfare applicable to the sinking of merchant vessels
by surface warships-they had been stopped by a warning shot, visited and
searched, found to have contraband aboard, and the safety of passengers and
crews had been assured before they were sunk. 35 That procedure was not to
continue.
On November 3, 1914 the British ~ve notice that "the whole of the North
Sea must be considered a military area.,,36 The British sea blockade of Germany
was so effective that the German Navy urged the need to counter it by a
declaration of a war zone around the British Isles within which all ships would
be sunk. The Foreign Office opposed such a procedure because ofits anticipated
effect on neutrals and the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, at first
agreed with the Foreign Office. However, early in 1915 the German
Government determined that it had no alternative but to use the submarine to
37
stop the flow of food and essential munitions to the British Isles and on
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February 4, 1915 the Gennan Admiralty issued a Proclamation declaring the
waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel,
to be a "war zone" in which, after February 18, 1915, all enemy merchant ships
would be destroyed without assuring the safety of the passengers and crews-in
other words, they would be sunk without warning?8 The Proclamation added
that, because, on January 31, 1915, the British Admiralty had ordered British
merchant vessels to fly neutral flags, even neutral merchant vessels would be at
risk in the announced zone. A lengthy "Memorial", issued at the same time,
justified the Gennan action as retaliation for British disregard of the provisions
of the 1909 Declaration of London and of the 1856 Declaration ofParis39 and
the British declaration of the North Sea between Scodand and Norway as being
"comprised within the seat of war" combined with neutral acceptance of these
40
British violations. It was thus that first arose a problem which continues to
plague the Governments and navies of the world and students of the law of
maritime warfare to this day-the question of the legality of war zones, under
any of the various names which have been given to such areas of the high seas
41
by belligerents.
The Gennan Proclamation caused considerable consternation in the United
States. Robert Lansing, then Counselor of the Department of State, prepared a
reply to the Gennan proclamation which he himself referred to as "sharp." It
described the Gennan intention as "a wanton act unparalleled in naval
warfare. ,,42 However, after he had read the accompanying "Memorial" he
relented considerably. Nevertheless, the United States protest may still be
described as "strong.'.43 The United States also protested to Great Britain the
use of the American flag by British merchant ships.44 As neither of these protests
accomplished its purpose, the United States proposed that each side should,
45
among oth er thi ngs, agree:
That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality
except to enforce the right of visit and search.
That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags
for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.

Gennany accepted this proposal with conditions. Great Britain rejected it on
the ground that the Gennan Proclamation of February 4, 1915 was, "in effect,
a claim to torpedo at sight"; and that submarines did not, and could not, comply
with the well-established rules of maritime warfare, such as bringing merchant
ships before prize courts, sinking them only when extraordinary circumstances
existed, distinguishing between neutral and enemy ships, assuring the safety of
crews, etc. 46 Ofcourse, the British position disregarded the fact that by accepting
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the proposed agreement Gennany would have, in effect, consented to give up
any claimed right to "torpedo at sight" with all of its corollaries.
This began a campaign of submarines as commerce destroyers, a campaign
that extended from February 1915 to September 1915, during which period
strong protests were made to the Gennan Government by the Government of
the United States over attacks upon and the sinking ofAmerican merchant vessels
and of other merchant vessels on which American citizens were traveling. The
matter reached a peak with the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 as a
result of which over 100 American citizens were lost. The U.S. protest included
the following statement: 47
The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the
objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies
in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of
commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and
humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically
impossible for the officers ofa submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine
her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her;
and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without
leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.

After another strong protest by the United States when the Arabic was sunk on
August 19, 1915, with American citizens aboard, Gennan submarines were
ordered not to attack passenger ships without a warning and an opportunity for
the passengers and crew to be taken to a place of safety.48 As this required the
submarine to come to the surface, an extremely dangerous procedure in a
confined area, all Gennan submarines were soon recalled from the English
Channel. One anonymous author believes that this seven-month period
(February-September 1915) "saw the submarine come of age as the first modem
weapon to make war a universal scourge, rather than a professional duel between
. al anmes
. and fleets. ,,49
nv
Thus, within the first year of World War I the use of the submarine had
generated issues with respect to the anning of merchantmen, the use of false
colors, the establishment of "war zones", the sinking of merchantmen without
warning, and the failure to assure the safety of the passengers and crews. All of
those issues continue to exist; only the latter two were addressed by the 1936
London Submarine Protocol. 50 The problem of the status of merchantmen
under convoy did not arise until much later in the war.
Disputes with respect to submarine warfare continued to arise and finally, on
April 18, 1916, the United States warned Gennany that if the latterintended to
continue "to prosecute relendess and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of
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commerce without regard to what the United States must consider the sacred
and indisputable rules ofinternationallaw and the universally recognized dictates
51
of humanity, " it would have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations. The
German reply, dated May 4, 1916, notified the United States Government that
52
the following instructions had been issued to German naval forces:
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of
merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and
without the area declared as [a] naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning
and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer
resistance.

The following months were comparatively free ofincidents but, understandably,
the success of the U-boats was considerably reduced. Ultimately, the German
Government decided that its only possibility of winning the war, which had
reached a stalemate on land, was to embark on a program of unrestricted
submarine warfare and an announcement of such a policy was suddenly made
on January 31, 1917, to take effect the following day.53 On February 3, 1917,
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany;54 on March 12,
1917, the United States announced its intention to arm its merchantmen;55 on
April 2, 1917, in a speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war against
Germany, President Wilson stated: "The intimation [of the German
Government] is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our
merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of the law and subject to be
dealt with as pirates would be,,;56 and on April 6, 1917, the United States
declared war on Germany.
Because of the magnitude of the problem created by the arming of
merchantmen during World War I, it is, perhaps, advisable to deal with it at
some length at this point. It is a problem which was and is important to neutrals
as well as belligerents inasmuch as Article 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention
No. XIII,57 provides that, in general, a warship may only remain in neutral
waters for twenty-four hours. If armed merchantmen are warships, then this rule
applies to them and if they remain in neutral waters beyond the
twenty-four-hour period, they are, under Article 24 of the same Convention,
subject to internment. If they were held to fall within the ambit of those
provisions, their utility as cargo carriers would be completely nullified as none
could accomplish unloading and reloading within that time frame. Germany
demanded that the United States (and other neutrals) apply the provisions of this
Convention to British armed merchantmen. The United States declined to do
so.58 It appears that The Netherlands was the only country that so interpreted
and applied the cited provisions of the Hague Convention. 59 One author has
taken the position that "neutrals are not justified in treating an armed merchant
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vessel as an innocent peaceful carrier. By so doing they risk their neutrality.,,60
A major work argues that neutral states "employed the convenient but elusive
and tenuous distinction between 'offensive' and 'defensive' armament" because
of their desire to avoid the need to apply the provisions of the 1907 Hague
61
Convention No. XIII to armed belligerent merchantmen.
62
The provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention No. vn require, among
other things, that merchant vessels converted into warships must be placed under
the direct authority of the State and must have a commander who is "in the
Service of the State and duly commissioned by the competent authorities" and
a crew which is subject to military discipline. When the British ordered the
arming of all of their merchant vessels, many of the captains and other officers
of these vessels held commissions in the Royal Navy Reserves and many of the
vessels were subsequendy furnished with Royal Navy gun crews. Nevertheless,
the British Government contended that these vessels were armed solely for
defensive purposes and that, therefore, these facts did not make them armed
auxiliary cruisers. The British were probably correct in contending that the status
of the officers and men did not bring the vessel within the provisions of this
Hague Convention. The vessels were not State vessels and the crews, other than
the gunners, were not subject to military discipline. However, whether the fact
that they were armed removed them from the category of vessels entided to the
protections of customary international law is an altogether different question.
It is often believed that the original decision of the British Government to
arm its merchant ships was reached as a measure ofprotection against submarines.
This is not so. In March 1913, when Churchill made his announcement in the
House of Commons,63 the British were not concerned with submarines, they
64
were concerned with converted merchant auxiliary cruisers. Thus he said:
There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign
merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting
of guns .... Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following
these trade routes would in certain contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and
equipped in the manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they
would be at the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one effective gun and a few
rounds of ammunition.... Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be
covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed
merchantman is another merchantman armed in its own defence.
Again, a year later, on March 17, 1914, he said:

65

The House will expect me to say a few words on the arming of merchant ships.
Much misconception has arisen on this subject.... Forty ships have been armed
with two 4.7 guns apiece, and by the end of1914-1915 seventy ships will have

Submarine Warfare

303

been so anned. They are anned solely for defensive purposes. The guns are
mounted in the stem and can only fire on a pursuer. Vessels so anned have nothing
in common with merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty and converted
into commissioned auxiliary cruisers, nor are these vessels privateers or commerce
destroyers in any sense. They are exclusively ships which carry food to this country.
They are not allowed to fight any ship ofwar.... They are, however, thoroughly
capable of self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantmen.

During the years that it was a neutral in World War I, the position of the
United States with respect to anned merchantmen was so ambivalent as to leave
much to be desired. However, as it was one of the main players with respect to
the problem, it will be ofinterest to analyze the pennutations and combinations
which were encountered in the negotiations on this subject and the decisions
which were made and unmade.
Within a few days after the beginning of the war the British Charge d'Affaires
in Washington called the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that "a
certain number" ofBritish merchant vessels were anned "solely for the purpose
of defence. ,,66 Two weeks later, the British Ambassador advised the Secretary
of State that he had been directed to give the United States:
the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes
ofattack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for purposes ofdefence,
that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any
.
CIrcumstances
attack any vessel~
.

Despite these assurances, it does not appear that the anned merchantmen used
their guns solely for defense, nor that the British Government expected them
to do so. Thus, confidential instructions to masters of armed merchant vessels
stated:68
If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day and it is evident to the master
that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defence,
notwithstanding the submarines [sic] may not have committed a definite hostile
act, such as firing a gun or torpedo.
Any submarine approaching a merchant vessel may be treated as hostile.

69

Moreover, when they became available, merchant ships were supplied with
depth charges, definitely an offensive weapon?O
In justification of the practice of arming merchant ships, and in support of
their contention that this did not remove them from a noncombatant status, the
British frequendy referred to the long history of anned merchant ships, pointing
out that this had been ordered by Royal Proclamation as early as the seventeenth
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century and that this right had been recognized by Prize Courts during the
Napoleonic Wars.71 They omitted to mention that this procedure had been
directed against pirates and privateers and that there were no longer pirates on
the well-traveled trade routes which the British ships were traversing and that
privateering had been prohibited by the 1856 Declaration ofParis.72
Lauterpacht, while a strong supporter of the right of a belligerent to arm its
merchant ships for defensive purposes, added the following caveat?3
At the same time it is clear that the arming of merchant vessels raises problems of
substantial difficulty. In the first place, it is not easy to draw a line of distinction
between offensive and defensive acts. Secondly, the encouragement of even
defensive hostilities on the part of private vessels is fraught with danger inasmuch
as it threatens to undermine the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of
Paris of 1856 [and the distinction?] between commissioned and
non-commissioned vessels. Thirdly, the fact that a merchantman is armed and that
she is entitled to resist actual or anticipated attack makes it impossible for enemy
submarines to exercise their right of visit and capture in accordance with
International Law without running the risk of destruction by the superior
armament of the merchant vessel or being rammed by her.
On September 19, 1914 the Department of State issued a memorandum,
prepared by Robert Lansing, entitled "The Status of Armed Merchant Vessels,"
which provided that, while a merchant vessel might carry armament and
ammunition for defensive purposes without becoming a warship, the presence
of such items aboard would create a presumption that they were for offensive
purposes, a presumption that could be overcome by showing that the vessel
carried its armament for defensive purposes only. The memorandum then
proceeded to list a number of "indications" that the armament would not be
used offensively, including such items as the size and number of the guns, their
location on the vessel, the status of the officers and crew, etc?4 With one
amendment which provided that the presence of any gun on a merchantman,
no matter what its size, would create the presumption of offensive use,75 this
memorandum laid down the policy followed by the United States during 1914
and 1915.
OnJanuary 7, 1916, Lansing, now the Secretary ofState, sent a memorandum
to President Wilson in which he pointed out the potential danger to submarines
of even a small caliber gun on an armed merchantman; that if submarines were
to be required to give warning to merchant vessels, the latter should not be
armed; and that armed merchantmen should, therefore, be treated as not
possessing the immunities of private commercial vessels. 76 President Wilson
concurred with these conclusions and, on January 18, 1916, Lansing circulated
an informal letter to the belligerents in which he set forth the general rules of
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international law and humanity understood to be applicable to noncombatant
merchant vessels during a war. He called attention to the manner in which the
submarine had changed maritime operations and the dangers it faced when
compelled to stop and search an armed merchant vessel on the high seas. He
t hen Sal·d77
:
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels
of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequendy, the placing ofguns
on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only
on the ground of a purpose to render a merchantman superior in force to
submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. An armament,
therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive
armament.
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement
ifit could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused
to adhere stricdy to the rules of intemationallaw in the matter of stopping and
searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and
removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as
prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be
prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.
I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the
argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the
character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft,
should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by
a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials
accordingly.

If the paragraph last quoted was intended to put pressure on Great Britain to
agree to the basic suggestion, as it undoubtedly was, it did not accomplish its
purpose. While the British Government's adamant opposition to the proposal
of the United States had probably previously been conveyed orally, it was not
until March 23, 1916 that the British Ambassador delivered to the Secretary of
State a memorandum from the British Government setting forth in some detail,
not always relevant, the reasons why that Government believed the proposal to
be pro-German, why it could not rely on a "non-guaranteed German promise",
and why it could not, therefore, accept the proposal made some two months
earlier. It also presented its reasons why it did not consider that the action
mentioned in the last ~aragraph of the American note would be in accordance
\vith international law. 8 The Germans also rejected the proposal, asserting that
it was pro-British?9 The British won both battles: they continued to arm their
merchantmen; and these armed merchantmen continued to be treated by the
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United States as ordinary merchant vessels "armed for defense only." On March
25, 1916, just two days after the date of the British memorandum, the
Department of State issued a new "Memorandum on the Status of Armed
Merchant Vessels" which was even more lenient on the subject than the 1914
memorandum had been. Two pertinent paragraphs provided: 80
The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be
determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of
previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances
of the case.
Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for the purposes ofprotection
against the enemy, are entided to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance
in the course oflegitimate trade.

In passing, it is worthy of note with respect to this problem that when, in
1928, the members of the then Pan American Union drafted a convention on
the subject of maritime neutrality, Article 12(3) provided that the rules relating
to warships would apply to armed merchantmen. The United States ratified the
··t
h a reservatlon
. to th at proVISlon.
.. 81
WI
C onventlon
In conclusion, it might be said that "defensively armed merchant vessels"
were properly so-called in that, unlike auxiliary merchant cruisers, they did not
go searching for enemy vessels; they were not properly so-called in that they
usually opened fire immediately upon sighting a U-boat, before it had taken any
offensive action other than to make its appearance. It should be obvious that the
82
present author agrees with the following statement:
The criteria [for determining whether a merchant vessel is participating in the
hostilities] should certainly include, inter alia, any armed merchant vessel and no
consideration should be given to the purported distinction between "defensive"
and "offensive" armament.

As we shall see, this same problem arose during the course of World War II.

83

Part III
The Intra-War Period (1919-1939)

The Versailles Treaty
In the course of drafting a suggested basic document for the proposed League
of Nations, to be submitted to the Peace Conference which met at the end of
World War I, President Woodrow Wilson sought comments from David H.
Miller, the Legal Adviser of the American Delegation to the Conference. In his
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comments on Wilson's Second Draft, Miller suggested the inclusion of the
'
•. 84
£11
o oWIng provlSlon:
The Contracting Parties agree never to make use of anned submarines in naval
operations, and further agree that they will hereafter build no submarines anned
or capable of being anned and further agree that all submarines now in existence
or under construction shall be dismantled and rendered incapable of being anned
or shall be destroyed.
Wilson did not adopt this suggestion and while Article 191 of the Treaty oj
Versailles85 which ended World War I as between Germany and the Allies,
specifically prohibited "[t]he construction or acquisition of any submarine, even
for commercial purposes" by Germany, the Covenant of the League of Nations
contained no provision on the subject. As events proved, this provision of the
86
Treaty, like many of the other provisions thereof, was of little value.

The 1921-1922 Washington Conference
In 1921 a Conference on the Limitation of Armament met in Washington.
The conferees represented the five major victorious Powers in World War I:
France, Great Britain (and the Commonwealth countries), Italy, Japan, and the
United States. When the discussion with respect to submarines began, the British
Delegation took the position that "what was required was not merely restrictions
on submarines, but their total and final abolition. ,,87 The French delegation was,
as it had been in the past, particularly opposed to the banning of the submarine
88
as an accepted naval weapons system, its delegate saying:
The French Government believes that every method of warfare mayor may not
be employed in conformity with the laws of war, and that the inhuman and
barbarous use made of the submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason
for condemning that belligerent, but not for condemning the submarine.
It quickly became obvious that the British proposal would not receive the
necessary support. As one commentator on the 1922 Diplomatic Conference
stated: "The British seem to hold that the submarine is an offensive weapon,
while the others consider that it is a defensive weapon. ,,89 Elihu Root, one of
the delegates of the United States and a former Secretary ofState, then submitted
several proposed resolutions to the Conference. These resolutions may be
considered to have been the genesis of the 1922, 1930, and 1936 codifications
of the rules relating to submarine warfare. Resolution I was said to be a statement
ofexisting law, while Resolution II was said to constitute a change in the existing
law. 90 An examination of the Root Resolutions, as minimally modified by the
Conference, will enable us to determine what the rules of submarine warfare
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were then considered to be and what the representatives of the nations present
considered that they should be, it being an accepted fact that the submarine was
here to stay.
91
Root's Resolution 1 became Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty then in process
of being drafted, with only one major change: the logical addition of a second
condition under which a merchant vessel might be attacked (when it refused
"to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed cifter seizure"). 92
As adopted and included in the Treaty which was ultimately drafted,93 these
articles stated:
Art. 1. The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time
of war, the following are to be deemed an established part ofintemationallaw;
(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine
its character before it can be seized.
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and
search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have
been first placed in safety.
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the
universal rules above stated; and if a submarine can not capture a vessel in
conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from
attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.
Art. 2. The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their
assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear
public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which
the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

The provisions of Article 1 have since been accepted as binding rules of the law
of war at sea by reiteration in substance in international agreemen~ subsequently
drafted. It will become apparent that they formed the basis for the provisions of
Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty94 and for those of its offipring, the
1936 London Submarine Protoco1. 95
There can be no question but that the provisions of Root's Resolution n96
represented a major addition to the restrictions on the use of submarines in war
at sea. It condemned the submarine for what a belligerent had done in World
War 1. It was adopted as Article 4 of the Treaty with only minor amendments
which did not affect its substantive content. It read:
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Art. 4. The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using

submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the
end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be
universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that
prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other
nations to adhere thereto.
This Article, outlawing the use of submarines against merchant vessels, even if
they complied with the provisions of Article 1, did not survive as a rule of the
law of war. Had it done so, it would, as Root had indicated, have supplanted
the rules set forth in Article 1, rules which codified then existing law.
97
Root's Resolution m was adopted as Article 3 of the Treaty with only one
major change. That change was the substitution of the words "rules declared by
them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant
ships" for the words "rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition of
the use of submarines in time of war." Under either reading, the provisions
cover violations of both Articles 1 and 4 of the Treaty. As Article 3 it now read:
Art. 3. The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane

rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure
and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service
of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is
under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the
laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as iffor an act of piracy and
may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities ofany Power within
the jurisdiction of which he may be found.
During the discussion of this Resolution the Japanese delegate asked for an
explanation of the meaning of the phrase "punishment as iffor an act ofpiracy."
The ambiguity of the phrase was demonstrated by the fact that the Chainnan,
Secretary of State Hughes, said that he assumed that it meant that a violation
should be treated as an act of piracy. Root was quick to indicate that it merel~
meant that there would be universal jurisdiction, as in the case of piracy.9
Inasmuch as the provision already specifically so provided, there was, in reality,
no need for the reference to piracy which merely caused confusion and antipathy.
Like Article 4, Article 3 has not survived as a separate rule of the law of war.
However, like any other violation of the law of war, violations of the provisions
of the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare constitute universal
war crimes and the violator may still "be brought to trial before the civil or
military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be
found"-depending, of course, on the domestic law of that Power. In fact, as
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we shall see, after W orId War II two Gennan Admirals, Doenitz and Raeder,
were charged with and tried for having allegedly ordered illegal submarine
warfare.
In its final fonn this 1922 Washington Treaty (which also contained a
provision banning the use of noxious gases) included in its Article VI a provision
which stated that it would "take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications."
Inasmuch as France failed to ratify it, the Treaty never took effect. 99 Perhaps
this was just as well. Admiral William V. Pratt, of the United States Navy, is
quoted as having written, a few days after the Conference ended, that the treaty
100
was not practical and that it would not work.
This Diplomatic Conference created a Commission ofJurists with the task
of determining the adequacy of certain rules of international law with respect
10l
to the law of war.
The Commission produced two sets of rules, one on
wireless telegraphy in time of war and one on aerial warfare. Article 6, paragraph
1, of the fonner stated 102
The wireless transmission, by an enemy or neutral vessel or aircraft while being
on or above the high seas, of any military information intended for a belligerent's
immediate use, shall be considered a hostile act exposing the vessel or aircraft to
be fired at;
As the Diplomatic Conference had adjourned sine die before the Commission
completed its work, neither set of rules ever received codified international
status. However, they undoubtedly represented the customary international law
on the subjects and are worthy of and have received considerable attention,
. fconnal status. 103
. th·
elr m
desplte
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Inter-American Convention on Maritime
Neutralityl04 sets forth in considerable detail the rules with respect to the rights
of belligerent warships towards merchant vessels, including a provision that a
ship may not be rendered unnavigable before the crew and passengers have been
placed in safety. Paragraph 2 makes these rules applicable to submarines with
the specific proviso that "[i]f the submarine cannot capture the ship while
observing these rules, it shall not have the right to continue to attack or to destroy
,,105
the ship.

The 1930 London Naval Conference
On January 21, 1930 another Conference on the Limitation of Annament
convened, this time in London. It was officially known as the London Naval
Conference of 1930. The participating Powers were the same as those which
had been represented in Washington eight years earlier. At the very first Plenary
Meeting at which the subject of submarines was discussed the British once again
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proposed the abolition of the submarine, this time with the full support of the
United States; and once again this proposal received the support of all of the
Commonwealth countries, but the opposition of France, Italy, and Japan.106
The United States had submitted a proposed resolution calling for the
appointment of a committee to consider (1) the abolition of the submarine; and
(2) regulation of the use of the submarine "through subjecting it to the rules of
war governing the use of surface craft." France had submitted a proposed
resolution "forbidding submarines to act towards merchant ships otherwise than
in strict conformity with the rules, either present or future, to be observed by
surface warships." 107 These resolutions were referred to a Committee ofExperts
108
and a Committee of Jurists. The latter produced a Declaration
which was
approved unanimously by the First Committee and which was approved without
· 109 A s mcorporate
.
d mto
.
.
. b y th e PIenary M
diSCUSSlon
eetmg.
th e T reaty, 110 It
111
read:
Art. 22. The following are accepted as established rules ofIntemational Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must confonn to
the rules ofInternational Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place
of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and
weather conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel
which is in a position to take them aboard.

These rules were, in general, a rephrasing and amplification of the rules which
had been included in Article 1 of the 1922 Washington TreatyY2 It is important
to note that while, pursuant to Article 23, the other provisions of the Treaty
ceased to be effective on December 31, 1936, Article 22 was "to remain in force
without limitation of time." Despite the fact that there was a provision for
accession to Part IV of the Treaty by other Powers, no non-Conference Power
ever acceded, perhaps because France and Italy did not ratify these provisions
until 1936.
In addition to drafting the Declaration which became Article 22 of the Treaty,
the Committee ofJurists made a statement which bears repeating. It said:
The Committee wishes to place it on record that the expression merchant vessels
where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be understood as including a
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merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in the hostilities in such a
manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel. l13
This would certainly include the merchant vessel which, when a submarine
surfaces in its vicinity, immediately opens fire or radios that it has sighted a
.
. . .Its 1ongttu
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. d e. 114
sub manne,
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The 1935-1936 London Naval Conference
In 1935 another Diplomatic Conference convened in London to draft a new
treaty limiting naval armament prior to the expiration of the 1930 London Naval
115
Treaty. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol
is frequendy associated with
the 1935-1936 London Naval Conference and with the Treaz for the Limitation
of Naval Armament that was drafted at that Conference. 11 Its relationship to
that Conference and Treaty is rather tenuous. At the opening session of the
117
Conference Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, said:
There is one further point that I should like to mention, because it appears to me
very encouraging for our future deliberations. If it proves impossible to obtain
agreement for the abolition of submarines, it is of vital importance to reach an
agreement which will prevent their misuse. Part IV of the London Naval Treaty
laid down rules for the treatment ofmerchant ships by submarines in time ofwar.
These rules are already in force between the United States, Japan and the members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But I am glad to be able to announce,
as a result of the preliminary talks with representatives of other nations, that, once
these rules have been incorporated in an instrunlent which will be distinct from
the London Naval Treaty, the French and Italian Governments who were unable
to ratify the London Treaty as a whole will be in a position definitely to accept
such an instrument. We hope that this will be the signal for the acceptance of
these rules by all the maritime Powers of the world and that, by this means,
unrestricted submarine warfare may in the future be averted.
However, at the Fifteenth Meeting of the First Committee, held on March 13,

1936, the French delegate found it necessary to stateYS
I am surprised not to see on the Agenda a subject on which we appeared all to be
agreed at the opening meeting of the Conference and which our First Committee
has not yet examined, namely, the embodiment in the Acts which our Conference
is to draw up of the rules of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty [of 1930],
concerning the use of submarines against merchant vessels.
The British representative pointed out that the two treaties were quite separate
(the Japanese had left the Conference and would not sign the Naval Treaty but
would sign the Submarine Protocol) and that as another text had to be prepared
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they could only hope that the two could be signed at the same timeY9 As a
matter of fact they were not, the Treaty being signed on March 25, 1936, and
the Protocol more than seven months later, on November 6, 1936. On the latter
date it (the Protocol) was signed by the five nations which had participated in
the drafting of both the 1930 and the 1936 London Naval Treaties: France,
Great Britain (and the Commonwealth Nations), Italy, Japan, and the United
States. Other nations were invited to accede to the Protocol and approximately
37 others had done so before World War II erupted, including all of the
European belligerents in that war except Rumania. Japan was a Party, but China
was not. Germany had acceded on November 23, 1936. 120

The Nyon Agreements
The Spanish Civil War which began in 1936 was the first such conflict since
the American Civil War in which submarines played a part. Because of their
method of operation, which included attacks on and the sinking of merchant
ships which did not belong to either side in the conflict, a number of concerned
nations met at Nyon, Switzerland, in 1937 and drafted the Nyon Agreement.
This agreement provl·ded:121
II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship [one not belonging to either side
in the conflict] in a manner contrary to the rules referred to in the International
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London
on April 22, 1930 and confinned in the Protocol signed in London on
November 6,1936, shall be counter-attacked and, ifpossible, destroyed.

In effect, the Parties to this Agreement were demanding that the contestants in
a civil war comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
122
(A Supplementary Agreement, signed three days later, made the
Protoco1.
original agreement applicable to surface vessels and aircraft.) Nine European and
Mediterranean States were Parties to these agreements. (Understandably, this
did not include Germany and Italy, both of which were actively supporting the
Franco insurgents who probably controlled all of the submarines involved.)
Shortly thereafter, on 5 October 1937, the Council of the League of Nations
123
adopted a Resolution which stated:
(7) Notes that attacks have taken place in violation of the most elementary
dictates of humanity underlying the established rules of international law which
are affinned, so far as war time is concerned, in Part IV of the Treaty of London
of April 22, 1930, rules which have been formally accepted by the great majority
of Governments.
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(8) Declares that all attacks of this kind against any merchant vessels are
repugnant to the conscience of the civilised nations which now find expression
through the Council.
It is strange that the League's Council referred to the 1930 Treaty, which had
only a few ratifications, and not to the 1936 Protocol, which, by this time, had
more than twenty-five ratifications and accessions.

Part IV
World War II and Its Aftermath (1939-1947)
As in the case ofWorId War I, the British Admiralty had prepared for another
conflict by ensuring that many of its merchant ships had been built with
reinforced areas for the mounting of guns and by storing guns to be used for
arming those ships.124 Moreover, the 1938 British Defense of Merchant Shipping
Handbook included the following provisions: 125
As soon as the Master of a merchant ship realises that a ship or aircraft in sight is
an enemy, it is his first and most important duty to report the nature and position
of the enemy by wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the
means of saving not only the ship herself but many others; ...
Conditions under which fire may be opened:
(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with International Law-As the
armament is solely for the purpose of self-defence, it must only be used against an
enemy who is clearly attempting to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the
outbreak of war it should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with
International Law, and fire should therefore not be opened until he has made it
plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it is clear that resistance will be
necessary if capture is to be averted, fire should be opened immediately.
(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of International Law-If, as the war
progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that, in defiance ofIntemational Law,
the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning, it
will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine, or
aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will
prevent her gaining a favorable position for attacking.

According to a British history ofWorId War II "between the outbreak of the
war and November 4 [1939], thirty-two British and three Allied ships had been
sunk illegally ... ; as many as thirty-three neutral ships had been attacked and at
least sixteen sunk in circumstances which led to the conclusion that the sinking
had been illegal." 126
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In his Memoirs, Admiral Doenitz, the Commander of the U-boat arm of the
German Navy for a large part of the war, later the Commander-in-Chief of the
German Navy, and, ultimately, Hider's successor, asserts that these Instructions
were "a contravention ofthe Submarine Agreement." He also indicates his belief
that the convoy system was contrary to the same Agreement. 127 Neither arming
merchant ships, nor ordering them to send by radio what can only be described
as intelligence information, nor sailing them in convoy under the protection of
warships, were acts contrary to the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
Protocol-but any of those acts removed the particular merchant ship involved
from the limited category of ships protected by that Agreement. 128
On November 27, 1939 the British Government issued an Order in Council
Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany which was intended, among
129
other things, to eliminate all German exports.
In response to neutral
complaints of violation of the 1856 Declaration of Paris,130 the British
Government said in notes to the Dutch and Italian Governments that "the main
basis of their actions is admittedly the right of retaliation the essence of which
is a departure from the ordinary rules as reprisal for illegal action by the
enemy.,,131 This was, of course, an admission by the British that the Order in
Council did, in fact, violate the 1856 Declaration of Paris and a claim that it
was, nevertheless, legal because by definition a reprisal contemplates an illegal
. b y th e party un d ertaking repns
. al actlon.
. 132
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On May 8, 1940, Churchill, once again First Lord of the Admiralty, stated
to the House of Commons that the Royal Navy had been instructed that in the
Skagerrak (a narrow arm of the North Sea between Denmark and Norway
leading into the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea) "all German ships by day and all
. served .,,133 This actlon
.
. h t were to b e sunk as opporturuty
was
ships b y rug
134
frequendy referred to by the Germans as a basis for their subsequent actions.
Although the International Military Tribunal found Doenitz guilty of violating
the 1936 London Submarine Protocol by establishing operational zones, it listed
Churchill's order as one ground for not assessing punishment against Doenitz
135
on the basis of German submarine warfare.
On August 28, 1939, a few days before the outbreak of World War II,
Germany had issued its Prize Ordinance136 which included some of the
protections provided by the 1936 London Submarine Protocol. A week later,
on September 3, 1939, Hider issued Fuehrer's Directive No.2, which provided
that offensive actions by the German Navy against Great Britain were permissible
but that "warfare against merchant shipping is for the time being to be conducted
.
,,137 F ueh rer'D·
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138
No.4, September 25, 1939, extended this directive to include the French.
The minutes of a conference between Hider and Admiral Raeder, Chief of
the Naval Staff, held on September 23, 1939, reveal the following decisions: 139
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2. The intensification of anti-submarine measures by aircraft and armed
merchant vessels will apparently make it impossible to search British merchantmen
in the future. The Fuehrer approved the proposal that action should be taken
without previous warning against enemy merchant ships definitely identified as
such (with the exception of unmistakable passenger steamers), since it may be
assumed that they are armed.
3. The expression 'submarine warfare' is to be replaced by the expression 'war
against merchant shipping.' The notorious expression 'unrestricted submarine
warfare' is to be avoided. Instead of this, the proclamation of the 'siege ofEngland'
is under consideration; such a military system would free us from having to observe
any restrictions whatsoever on account of objections based on International Law.

Fuehrer's Directive No.5, September 30, 1939, implemented these decisions.

It proVl'de d:140
The war against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to
prize law, with the following excep'tions.
(1) Merchantmen and troopships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be
attacked without warning.
(2) The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the
British Isles.
(3) Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio
transmitters when stopped.
(4) As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large
steamships as appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers as well as goods.
Even assuming that "hostile" merely meant "enemy," the first part of the first
exception (merchantmen, not anned merchantmen) was a violation of the
Protocol; the second part of that exception (troopships) was valid; the second
exception was probably justified;141 the third was undoubtedly justified;142 and
the fourth was intended to avoid incidents such as that of the Lusitania in World
143
War I and of the Athenia in World War 11.
During World War II Gennany contended that its use of the submarine as a
commerce destroyer Was a legal reprisal because of such British violations of the
law of naval warfare as arming merchant vessels, ordering them to radio reports
of submarine sightings, ordering them to navigate without lights at night,
ordering them to ram submarines, violations of the rules pertaining to blockades,
. his M emOlrs,
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In the same way Naval High Command reacted only with extreme caution and
step by step to the British measures which I have just described and which
constituted a breach of the London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by
one the restrictions on the conduct of U-boat operations were removed in a series
of orders from Naval High Command-beginning with permission to fire upon
vessels which used their wireless, which sailed without lights and which carried
guns, followed (as a result' of the instructions to ram given to British ships) by
permission to attack all vessels identified as hostile and ending with a declaration
of sea areas that would be regarded as operational zones ....
It is, then, an established fact that from the very outset the German Naval High
Command painstakingly adhered to the provisions ofintemationallaw contained
in the London agreements and that it was only step by step, in response to breaches
of these provisions by the enemy, that we allowed ourselves more and more
latitude, until finally, we reached the stage, as it was inevitable that we would,
where the London agreement was abandoned completely and for good.

Actually, there was no need for Gennany to place its actions on a reprisal
146
The British modus operandi constituted their merchant vessels naval
basis.
auxiliaries, subject to the same treatment as warships - that of being attacked
without warning immediately upon being sighted. As one author has stated, the
provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol did not extend, and were
not intended to extend, to the "warshiplike merchantmen" of the British
147
merchant marine.
Many publicists are of the opinion that these, and other,
British procedures changed the status of anned British merchantmen from
noncombatants to combatants, that it integrated them into the British naval
forces, and that the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol were,
148
therefore, no longer applicable to them.
The Commander's Handbook on the
LawoJNaval Operations, issued by the United States Navy in 1987, states: 149
During World War II the practice ofattacking and sinking enemy merchant vessels
by surface warships, submarines, and military aircraft without prior warning and
without first providing for the safety of passengers and crew was widespread on
both sides. Rationale for these apparent departures from the agreed rules of the
1936 London Protocol varied. Initially, such acts were justified as reprisals against
illegal acts of the enemy. As the war progressed, however, merchant ships were
regularly armed and convoyed, participated in intelligence collection, and were
otherwise incorporated direcdy or indirecdy into the enemy's war-fighting/war
sustaining effort. Consequendy, enemy merchant vessels were widely regarded as
legitimate military targets subject to destruction on sight.
Shortly after the beginning of World War II the United States Congress
enacted a Neutrality Act which, among other things, authorized the President
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to place restrictions "on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United
States by the submarines or armed merchantmen of a foreign state." It also made
it unlawful for foreign vessels to fly the American flag (a rather difficult provision
to enforce) and authorized the President to designate "combat areas" within
150
A Presidential
which American flag vessels were forbidden to proceed.
Proclamation issued immediately thereafter placed such restrictions on the use
of American p'orts and territorial waters on submarines, but not on armed
merchantmen!151 Unlike the situation during World War I, the entrance into
the ports of the United States by armed British merchantmen from the early
days of World War II did not seem to cause the Administration any concern
and was completely uncontrolled. From the very beginning of the war these
vessels were treated as peaceable cargo ships and Borchard's strong ~rotest
appears to have occasioned little comment and no change of policy. 1 This
must be considered as one of the many indications of official American political
policy favoring the British, rather than as a thoughtful interpretation of the
applicable law.
In accordance with the authority granted by the Neutrality Act, President
Roosevelt also issued a Proclamation designating a "combat area" within which
153
American flag vessels were forbidden to navigate.
Germany availed itself of
this combat zone and declared its zone, within which all vessels would be sunk
without warning, to coincide with the American zone. During his
cross-examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, before
the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz testified: 154
I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat
zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering
damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration
would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition
or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exacdy the same way as an enemy
transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to tum the seas around the enemy's
country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law,
although I am only a soldier.
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe: I see.
Doenitz: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance of combat areas. Whoever
enters a comb~t area must take the consequences.

During this cross-examination Doenitz was also asked, "If you sank a neutral
ship which had come into that [declared operational] zone, you considered that
you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to
look after the safety of the crews?" To this, he replied: "In operational areas I
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am obliged to take care of the survivors after an engagement, if the military
"
. ,,155
sltuallon permlts.
In finding Doenitz guilty of violating the 1936 London Submarine Protocol
by virtue of the German establishment of "operational zones," the International
Military Tribunal stated that the conferees in Washington in 1922, in London
in 1930, and in London again in 1936, had had full knowledge of the fact that
"operational zones" (or "war zones," or "exclusion zones," or "combat zones,"
under whatever name one may give to them), had been declared by both sides
during World War I, "[y]et the protocol made no exception" for them. 156 It is
of interest to note that there was no mention whatsoever of such zones during
the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the provisions of the 1922
Washington Treaty, nor of those of the 1930 London Naval Treaty whic~
became the 1936 London Submarine Protocol; and that there were no
discussions whatsoever involved in the drafting of the Protocol itsel£ Would it
not be just as logical to interpret all this as indicating that there 'Yas no intention
on the part of the draftsmen of those agreements to legislate with respect to this
problem, which went far beyond submarine warfare in the scope of its
application, that there was no desire or authority on their part to establish rules
in an area which did not relate exclusively to submarine warfare?157 Moreover,
while the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty of waging unrestricted submarine
warfare on what amounted to a tu quoque defense, it failed to find him not guilty
of the use of operational zones on that same basis despite undisputed evidence
that the British practice in this respect was identical with, and had preceded, that
of the Germans. 15S
There is one aspect of submarine warfare which appears to warrant mention
even though there can be no question as to the criminal liability of any person
engaged in it: the murder ofthe shipwrecked crews and passengers ofships which
have been sunk. This problem arose during World War II because ofan incident
involving the Laconia, a British ship which was sunk in September 1942 by a
German submarine which then discovered that a large number of Italian
prisoners of war had been among those on board. The submarine took in tow
several lifeboats (as it happened, the occupants of the lifeboats included a
substantial number of members of the British crew), with a large Red Cross
displayed, and sent a message, in English in the clear, asking for assistance in the
rescue efforts, promising to take no aggressive action against any vessel coming
to render assistance as long as none was taken against his U-boat. Unfortunately,
the only response was by an American bomber which attacked and damaged
the U-boat, causing it to cast the lifeboats adrift and to submerge. 159 When this
was reported to Doenitz he issued the so-called "Laconia Order" which
provl'ded:160
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(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk,
and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats,
righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter
to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and
crews.
(2) Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance
for your boat.
(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for women and
children in his bombing attacks on German cities.
At Nuremberg the British prosecutor contended that this was an order to destroy
any survivors of the ships sunk by German submarines, contending that this had
long been German submarine policy. Evidence was adduced of a conversation
between Hitler and Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, which the
161
International Military Tribunal for the Far East reported as follows:
OSHIMA had a conference with Hitler on January 3,1942. Hitler explained his
policy of submarine warfare, which he was conducting against Allied shipping,
and said that although the United States might build ships very quickly, her chief
problem would be the personnel shortage since the training ofseafaring personnel
took a long time. Hitler explained that he had given orders for his submarines to
surface after torpedoing merchant ships and to shoot up the lifeboats, so that the
word would get around that most seamen were lost in torpedoings and the United
States would have difficulty in recruiting new crews. OSHIMA, in replying to
Hitler, approved this statement ofpolicy and stated that the Japanese would follow
this method of waging submarine warfare.
Concerning this matter the International Military Tribunal said:

162

It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not carry out the
warning and rescue provisions of the protocol but that Doenitz deliberately
ordered the killing of the survivors of shipwrecked vessels, whether enemy or
neutral. The prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders
ofDoenitz, war order No.154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order
of 1942. The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them
do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty
required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors.
The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure.
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The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [ofthe 1936 Protocol] were
not carried out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be carried
out. The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the
first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the development ofaircraft made
rescue impossible. This may be so, but the protocol is explicit. If the commander
cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should
allow it to pass hannless before his periscope. These orders, then, prove Doentiz
is guilty of a violation of the protocol.
To summarize, in passing up~n the charges of illegal submarine warfare made
against German Admiral Doenitz, the International Military Tribunal discussed
and reached decisions on four asjects of the question: 1) waging unrestricted
submarine warfare (not guilty);16 2) the proclamation of operational zones and
the sinking of neutral merchant ships therein (guilty); 3) ordering that the
shipwrecked be killed (not guilty); and 4) failure to rescue the shipwrecked
(guilty). However, because of the evidence of a number ofBritish and American
practices, no sentence was assessed against Doenitz for the foregoing offenses of
which he was found guilty.164
What were the reasons for the failure to comply with the rules of customary
international law with respect to submarine warfare during the course ofWorId
War I and for the failure to comply with those rules, as codified in the 1936
London Submarine Protocol, during the course ofWorId War II? One student
of the problem has answered that question as follows: 165
The non-observance of the rules of the Protocol could be explained with the help
of military considerations: impossibility for the aircraft to act in conformity with
the rules, impossibility for the German surface warships to penetrate into and
effectively control the waters surrounding the British Isles, and, as far as submarines
were concerned, the unacceptable risk involved in the procedure of surfacing,
ascertaining the character of the ship and cargo, ordering the ship to be abandoned
and waiting until the order was carried out and those on board as well as the papers
and mail were safe in the ship's boats, in an area where the superior enemy forces,
warned with the aid of technical devices like radio and radar or by air
reconnaissance, could arrive on the scene in very litde time.

Part V
Post-World War II (1948-to date)

As the footnotes will have indicated, there has been much discussion of the
question of restrictions on submarine warfare and the continued viability of the
1936 London Submarine Protocol since the end of World War II and the
completion of the trial before the International Military Tribunal. However,
unfortunately, there has been no attempt on the part of the international
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community to clarify a very confused situation, something that should be
avoided at all costs in the law of war. The only "official" action which has been
taken in this respect during the past forty or more years is the issuance by the
U.S. Navy of its Commander's Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operations. That
. 166
. teo
h fc 11OWIng:
voIume contams
Although the rules of the 1936 London Protocol continue to apply to surface
warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including
satellite communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems,
as well as the customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following
World War II. Accordingly, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and
destroyed by surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of the
following circumstances:
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture;

2. Refusing to stop upon being summoned to do so;
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;
4. If armed; 167
5. Ifincorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the
enemy's armed forces;
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed
forces;
7. If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.
In an earlier volume, entitled LAw ofNaval Warfare, sub-paragraph 4, above, had
included the additional words "and there is reason to believe that such armament
has been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy.,,168 In
explanation of the deletion of those words, a proposed Annotated Supplement
to the Handbook, which is unofficial and which is still in draft form, states:
In light of modem weapons it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible,
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively against an
enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able
to make that determination. Accordingly, this rule has been modified in this text
from that previously appearing in NWIP 10-2, para. 503b(3).4.
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In the 1987 volume we find a number of references to submarines and to
submarine warfare. Having stated that "[t]he law of armed conflict imposes
essentially the same rules on submarines as apply to surface warships (a paraphrase
of the first paragraph of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol), the Handbook
goes on to say: 169
8.3.1. Interdiction oJEnemy Merchant Shipping by Submarines. The conventional rules
of naval warfare pertaining to submarine operations against enemy merchant
shipping constitute one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict.
Although the submarine's effectiveness as a weapons system is dependent upon its
capability to remain submerged (and thereby undetected) and despite its
vulnerability when surfaced, the London Protocol of 1936 makes no distinction
between submarines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction ofenemy
merchant shipping. The London Protocol specifies that except in the case of
persistent refusal to stop when ordered to do so, or in the event ofactive resistance
to capture, a warship, "whether surface or submarine" may not destroy an enemy
merchant vessel "without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers
.in a place of safety." The impracticality of imposing upon submarines the same
targeting constraints as burden surface warships is reflected in the practice of
belligerents ofboth sides during World War II when submarines regularly attacked
and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping. As in the case of such
attacks by surface warships, this practice was justified either as a reprisal in response
to unlawful acts of the enemy or as a necessary consequence of the arming of
merchant vessels, of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant
shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort.
The United States considers that the London Protocol of 1936, coupled with
the customary practice of belligerents during and following World War II,
imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of
passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel unless:
1. The enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do so or
otherwise resists capture.
2. The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itselfarmed.
3. The enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's military
intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary to the enemy's
armed forces.
4. The enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its warfighting or
war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the

324

Levie on the Law of War

circumstances ofthe specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger
or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

In a learned discussion of this problem which arrives at conclusions closely
resembling those reached by the draftsmen ofthe Handbook, one author states: 170
Besides the two circumstances mentioned in Article 22 (2) of the London Naval
Treaty of 193G-persistent refusal to stop on being summoned and active
resistance to visit and search-there are other situations in which international law
may allow the attack and destruction of merchant vessels. They include:
i) sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft.

ii) if armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used,
or is intended for use offensively against an enemy.
iii) if incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of an
enemy's armed forces.
iv) ifacting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed
forces

He immediately points out that "[m]any British writers question the validity of
some of these situations."
Conclusions

Can it be said that, after the experiences of two World Wars, the mandates
ofthe 1936 London Submarine Protocol, codifYing customary international law,
are still a valid and binding part of the law of war at sea? The International
Military Tribunal, sitting after the conclusion of those two conflagrations, left
no doubt that in its opinion the provisions of the Protocol had been, during
World War II, and still were, after that conflict, very much alive and binding.
A majori~ of the writers who have studied the problem are of a similar
opinion. 1 1 Although it is unquestionably true that a rule of international law
may be changed by evidence of a substantial change in the practice of States, the
failure of one belligerent in World War I to comply with the applicable rules
of customary international law, following which it was severely chastised for its
action and the rules were codified, and the failure of three belligerents in World
War II (Germany, Japan, and the United States), even though they may have
been major maritime Powers, to comply with the provisions of the Protocol
does not forever erase them from the rule book. During World War I all of the
Entente Powers and the United States, both as a neutral and as a Power associated
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with the Entente Powers, insisted that the rules with respect to submarine
warfare, which were then a part of customary international law and are now set
forth in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, were valid and binding rules.
During the interim between the wars a large number of the nations of the world,
including in many cases those which later did not comply therewith, accepted
these rules in conventional form in 1922, in 1930, in 1936, and in 1937. The
failure of Germany, Japan, and the United States to comply with those rules
during World War II did not result in their nullification. It must also be borne
in mind that in both World Wars Germany contended that her failure to comply
with the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare was an act of
reprisal, i.e., an admittedly illegal act. The same argument may, perhaps, be made
for the United States inasmuch as a Japanese submarine had already sunk. an
American merchantman without warning when the message ordering
unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States Navy, concerning which
172
(No evidence could be found that Japan
Admiral Nimitz testified, was sent.
claimed that her unrestricted submarine warfare was an act of reprisal.) 173
Which brings the present author to the following conclusions:
1. While, during World War II, the provisions of the 1936 London
Submarine Protocol were largely not applied, this was frequendy excused by
the particular belligerent, not on the basis that they were no longer a part of the
law of war at sea, but on the basis of reprisals against illegal actions on the part
of the enemy (arming of merchant vessels with guns and depth charges, sailing
them in warship-escorted convoys, ordering the immediate reporting by radio
of submarine sightings, ordering merchant vessels to ram submarines, illegal
mining, illegal expansion of the list of contraband, illegal blockades, declarations
of war zones, etc.), in itself a recognition of the continuing validity of those
provisions;

2. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol continues to be a valid and
subsisting part of the law of war at sea;
3. If the establishment ofzones (operations zones, war zones, exclusion zones,
combat zones, etc.) is determined to be a legal method of making war at sea,
the application of the rules of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol will be
largely, but not entirely, nullified, at least in the zones so declared;
4. It is highly probable that in any World War III belligerents will again find
reasons why the 1936 London Submarine Protocol should not be applied;
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5. In any future armed conflict oflesser extent than a World War III the
pressure of neutral Powers may be sufficiently strong to cause the belligerents
to comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol.
One cannot do better than to conclude a study ofthe submarine with a portion
of the final conclusion reached by a noted expert in a book recently published: 174
The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must
therefore be recognised as having begun.... Five hundred years ago, before the
sailing-ship pioneers ventured into great waters, the oceans were an empty place,
the only area of the world's surface in which men did not deploy military force
against each other. In a future war the oceans might appear empty again, swept
clear both of merchant traffic and of the navies which have sought so long to
protect it against predators. Yet the oceans' emptiness will be illusory, for in their
deeps new navies of submarine warships, great and small, will be exacting from
each other the price of admiralty.
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be necessary to refer to the use of "operational zones," the question of their legality is beyond the scope of
this article. The reader interested in this subject is referred to the definitive discussion thereofin Maritime War
Zones and Exclusion Zones by L.F.E. Goldie, 64 International Law Studies 156 (1991). See also W J. Fenrick,
The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Waifare, 1986 Can. Y.B. Int'I L. 91. At this point it will suffice
to say that "[t]he German operational area may be justified as a legitimate reprisal to the British one." William
T. Mallison, Jr., Submarines in General and Limited Wars, Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare (1966).
42. 5 Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters 247, 250-251 (1935) (hereinafter Baker].
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43. For. Rei. 98-100 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am.J. Int'1. L. 86-88 (Spec. Supp. 1915). The United States note
said, in part:
To declare or exercise a right to attack any vessel entering a prescribed area without first certainly
detennining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of the cargo would be an act so
unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial
Government of Gennany contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral
flags improperly can create no presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the
same suspicion. It is to detennine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right
of visit and search to have been recognized.
44. For. ReI. 100-101 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am.J. Int'1. L. 88-89 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
45. For. ReI. 119-120 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am.J. Int'1. L. 97-98 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
46. For. ReI. 127-128 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am.J. Int'1. L. 99,101,106 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
47. For. ReI. 393 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am.J. Int'1. L. 129, 131 (Spec. Supp. 1915). It will be noted that this
protest repeated many of the arguments which had been advanced by the British in rejecting the proposal
made by the United States.
48. For. ReI. 530-531 (Supp. 1915); 10 Am.J. Int'!. L. 166 (Spec. Supp. 1916). One author construes
this decision as:
a significant admission by Gennany that the right of unanned belligerent merchantmen were
recognized by international law, and that the duty with respect to warning and the saving of human
life was as applicable to the submarine as to the surface warship.
Horace B. Robertson,Jr., Submarille Wa!fi!re,JAG.J. 3 (November 1956).
49. Submarines 14 (1983).
50. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of22 April 1930, siglled at London, November 6, 1936,3 Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States of America, 1776-1949, at 298 (Charles I. Bevans ed.) [hereinafter Bevans]; 31 Am.J.
Int'I. L. 137 (Supp. 1937); 173 L.N.T.S. 353; 140 B.F.S.P. 300; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 883.
Although it is officially a "Proces- Verbal, " it is generally referred to as a "Protocol."
51. For. Rei. 232-234 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.J. Int'1. 1. 185, 190 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
52. For. ReI. 257, 259 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.J. Int'1. 1. 195, 198 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
53. For. ReI. 100 (Supp. 1,1917); 11 Am.J. Int'1. L. 332, 333 (Spec. Supp. 1917). One well-regarded
expert in this field concluded that "in international law Gennany had a good case. She failed to exploit it
effectively in neutral eyes and eventually roused the neutrals to anger." O'Connell, supra note 37, at 48.
54. For. ReI. 106 (Supp. 1, 1917); 11 Am.J. Int'I. 1. 335-337 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
55. For. ReI. 171 (Supp. 1,1917); 11 Am.]. Int'I. L. 344-345 (Spec. Supp. 1917). The "Anned Ship
Bill" passed the House by a lopsided margin but was successfully filibustered in the Senate. President Wilson
then decided to exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the Navy to furnish American
merchantmen with guns and gun crews. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing 224-225 (1970
ed.).
56. For. ReI. 195, 197 (Supp. 1,1917); 11 Am.J. Int'1. L. 350, 352 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
57. 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, siglled at The Hague, October 18, 1907,36 Stat. 2415; T.S. 545; 2 Am.J. Int'1. L. 202 (Supp. 1908);
100 B.F.S.P. 448; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 951.
58. For. ReI. 613 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.J. Int'I. L. 238-239 (SpelL. Supp. 1915).
59. The Dutch reply to a British protest, stated:
The observation of a strict neutrality obliges them to place in the category of vessels assimilated to
belligerent warships those merchant vessels ofthe belligerent parties that are provided with an annament
and that consequently would be capable of committing acts of war.
Brit. ParI. Papers, Misc., No. 14 (1917) Cd 8690, quoted ill International Law Situations, 1930, at 14.
60. Edwin Borchard, Amled Mercllalltmell, 34 Am.J. Int'1. L. 107, 111 (1940).
61. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 565 n. 117
(1962). The authors also point out that:
The construction of this "right to resist" urged by the same writers and by the British Government
was singularly liberal. Attack was said to include the attempt to capture, and the attempt to capture
included the attempt to exercise visit and search. In net effect, an anned merchantman was, under this
view, entitled to start firing upon being sighted and approached by an enemy force.
62. See supra note 29.
63. See supra text accompanying note 29.
64. 50 Parl. Deb., H.C. 1750 (5th ser. 1913). It will be noted that Churchill spoke of a British "anned
merchantman" meeting a foreign "anned merchantman." Actually, he was undoubtedly referring to a foreign
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"armed merchant cruiser." Moreover, he continued to fail to make this vernal distinction. On]une 11, 1913,
during a question period, he was asked: "Is it not a fact that these ships are armed for defence only and not
for attack?" to which he replied: "Surely these ships will be quite valueless for the purpose of attacking armed
vessels of any kind. What they are serviceable for is to defend themselves against the attack of another vessel
of their own standing." 53 id. at 1599 (1913). (The question was undoubtedly "planted"!)
65. 59 id. at 1925 (1914). The extent of this operation is indicated by the fact that by the end of the war
4,139 merchant ships had been armed. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 319. During World War I Germany
had no "armed merchantmen" although it did have some "commissioned auxiliary cruisers"; and the guns to
which Churchill referred were very much used against "ships of war" inasmuch as they were used against
submarines. In a memorandum of October 13, 1914, the German Government stated that the purpose of the
armament on the merchantmen was for armed resistance against German cruisers and that "[s]uch resistance
is contrary to international law because a merchant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against a war vessel."
(The issue of the right of such armed vessels to remain in neutral ports more than twenty-four hours was also
raised.) For. ReI. 613 (Supp. 1914); 10 Am.]. Int'l. L. 321 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
66. For. ReI. 598 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.]. Int'1. L. 223 (Spec. Supp. 1915). The British Privy Council
has held that "it must be recollected that defence is not confined to taking to one's heels or even resuming a
blow, but, in the jargon of strategy, may consist in an offensive-defensive, or in plain words in hitting first."
International Law Situations, 1930, at 6,8. And as one author stated: "[I)f a surprise shell which sent down a
submarine and its crew had been fired in self-defence, the pity is that the drowning men would be unable to
detect its difference from an offensive shell." Kenkichi Mori, The Submarine in War 86 (1931) [hereinafter
Mori].
67. For. ReI. 604 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.]. Int'1. L. 230 (Spec. Supp. 1915). In view of the provisions of
the 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 57, the British Ambassador also stated that "Hi.; Majesty's
Government hold the view that it is not in accordance with neutrality and intemationallaw to detain in neutral
ports merchant ships armed with purely defensive armaments." For. ReI. 606 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.]. Int'!. L.
231 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
68. For. ReI. 196 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.]. Int'1. L. 332 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
69. 10 Am.]. Int'!. L. 339, 340 (Spec. Supp. 1916). On a number of occasions the United States called
attention to the use of guns on merchant ships for offensive purposes. See, e.g., For. ReI. 849-850 (Supp.
1915).
70. The same procedure was followed in World War II. 13 International Military Tribunal, Trial of
Major War Criminals 258 (1947) [hereinafter T.M.W.C.].
71. For. ReI. 607, 608 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.]. Int'1. L. 232 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
72. See supra note 39.
73. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 27, at 469. Elsewhere he states that: "An overwhclmingweight
of authority recognized that their defensive armament in no way altered the legal status of these vessels." Id.
at 468. While this is probably true as to most British writers on the subject, it is probably not true in general.
See, e.g., itifra note 74, and the Borchard article cited supra in note 60.
74. For. ReI. 611-612 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am.]. Int'1. L. 234-235 (Spec. Supp. 1915). Secretary of State
Bryan disagreed \vith this memorandum and in a letter to President Wilson he argued that "the character of
the vessel is determined, not by whether she resists or not, but by whether she is armed or not ..• the fact
that she is armed raises the presumption that she will use her arms." Baker, supra note 42, at 354.]ohn Bassett
Moore, one of the deans of international law in the United States, said of Secretary Bryan's position that "it
was obviously founded in law and common sense." John B. Moore, Fifty Years ofInternational Law, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 395, 439 (1937).
75. For. ReI. 749 (Supp. 1916).
76. Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 100-101.
77. For. ReI. 146-148 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.]. Int'!. L. 310,312-313 (Spec. Supp. 1916). Ofthe problem
created by permitting merchant vessels to be armed and yet considering them to be noncombatants, while
requiring the submatine to comply with the law applicable to surface warships, one expert in the law of
submarine warfare has written:
It soon became apparent [in World War I) that even a British armed merchant ship sailing alone
presented a very real military danger to German submarines which attempted to comply with traditional
law. The predictable result of the new situation was that consideration of military necessity, as well as
simply self-preservation, led to the submarine remaining submerged and making torpedo attacks
without warning.
William T. Mallison,]r., supra note 41, at 107. A similar conclusion was reached by a number of other students
of the problem. See, e.g., the Grotius Committee Report, supra note 14, at 155; Hyman G. Rickover, supra
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note 13, at 1223: Alex A. Kerr, International Law and the Future q[Submarine Warfare, 81 u.s. Nav. Inst. Proc.
1105, 1109 (October 1955).
78. For. Rei. 211 (Supp.1916); 10 Am.J. Int'!.L. 336 (Spec.Supp. 1916). The other Allied Governments
answered in the same vein.
79. In his Memoirs, Lansing, although strongly pro-British, said:
Briefly, the British Government wished international law enforced when they believed that it
worked to the advantage of Great Britain and wished the law modified when the change would benefit
Great Britain.
Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 111. The German response was a memorandum ofl0 February 1916 in
which it was stated that armed merchantmen were not entided to the status of peaceable vessels of commerce
and that German naval vessels were receiving orders "to treat such vessels as belligerents." For. ReI. 163-165
(Supp. 1916); 10 Am.J. Int'1. L. 314-318 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
80. For. ReI. 244-248 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.J. Int'1. L.367, 369-370 (Spec. Supp. 1916). The vacillation
of the United States on this matter and its ultimate improper decision was pointed out with vigor by Borchard
when the same problem arose in the early years of World War II. He termed the March 1916 memorandum
a "humiliating retreat." Edwin Borchard, supra note 60, at 107. But see Mori, supra note 66, at 86-87. Another
expert in the field asserted that it "represented a return to a pro-Allied policy in the guise of a return to
traditional law." William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 111.
81. Inter-American Convention on Maritime Neutrality, signed at Havana, February 20, 1928, 47 Stat.
1989; T.S. 845; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 721. (There are only eight Parties to this Convention, all of the
major Latin-American nations having failed to ratify it.) Article 2 of the Harvard Research in International
Law, Rights and Duties ifNeutral Slates in Naval and Aerial War, 33 Am.J. Int'!. L. 167,224 (Spec. Supp. 1939)
provides that belligerent merchant vessels "shall, if armed for defense or offense, be assimilated to warships."
See also Articles 28 and 55 ofthat document. However, Article 3 (2) ofthe Scandinavian Declaration Regarding
Similar Rules of Neutrality, signed at Stockholm, May 27, 1938, 188 L.N.T.S. 295, 32 Am. J. Int'!' L. 141
(Supp. 1938) states:
2. Access to [Danish] ports or to [Danish] territorial waters is likewise prohibited to armed merchant
ships of the belligerents if the armament is destined to ends other than their own defense.
82. William T. Mallison,Jr., supra note 41, at 120.
83. It\vill have been noted that no mention has been made ofthe famous "Q-ships." These were warships
disguised as unarmed merchant ships and were undoubtedly another reason why Germany elected to
discontinue the practice of having a submarine surface and warn during the course of World War 1. Id. at 67.
84. 2 David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 65, 74 (1928).
85. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers, of the One Part, and Germany, of the
Other Part, signed at Versailles,June 28,1919,2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 43, 127; 112 B.F.S.P. 1, 94; 225
Perry C.T.S. 188,276. (The United States did not ratify this Treaty because of the Senate's objections to the
Convenant of the League of Nations which was a part thereof. However, Article 191 (in Part V) was carried
over into the Treaty Between the United States and Germany for the Establishment of Friendly Relations,
signed at Berlin, August 25, 1921,42 Stat. 1939; T.S. 658; 114 B.F.S.P. 828.)
86. Within a few years ofVersail1es the German Navy was able to arrange to retain its expertise in the
submarine field through the use of Dutch and Spanish connections. Erich Raeder, My Life 138-139 (1960);
Francis L. Carsten, The Reichwehr and Politics 1918-1933, at 242-244 (1966);John Keegan, The Price of
Admiralty 221 (1989).
87. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922,
at 467 (1922) (hereinafter 1922 Washington Conference].
88. !d. at 486.
89. Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After: A Historical Survey 81 (1928). World
War I had already demonstrated the correctness of the British position and World War II confirmed it.
90. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 610.
91. !d. at 596.
92. During the course of the discussion, the Italian representative stated that his delegation understood
the term "merchant vessel" to refer to unarmed merchant vessels. !d. at 688. He adhered to this definition
despite remonstrances from the British delegate. ld. at 690, 692. The Soviet text International Law 438 (F.I.
Kozhevnikov ed., n.d.) indicates that the 1936 Protocol applies only to "unarmed merchantmen."
93. Treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan Relating
to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, signed at Washington, February 6,1922, supra note
87, at 1605; 16 Am.J. Int'!. L. 57 (Supp. 1922); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 789. It must be emphasized
that this Treaty never became effective. It required the unanimous acceptance of the drafting States and France
refused to ratifY it. Nevertheless, both the 1930 London Naval Treaty, infra note 94, and the 1936 London
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Naval Treaty, irifra note 116, refer to the 1922 Washington Treaty as though it were an effective international
agreement.
94. Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament (London Naval Treaty), signed at London, April 22,
1930,46 Stat. 2858; T.S. 830; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 1055; 112 L.N.T.S. 65; 132 B.P.S.P. 603.
95. See supra note 50.
96. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 596.
97. ld.
98. !d. at 728. He added: "The peculiarity about piracy was that, though the act was done on the high
seas and not under the jurisdiction ofany particular country, nevertheless it could be punished by any country."
Unfortunately, he had previously stated that the Conference was "competent to declare that those who violated
the laws of war were guilty of acts of piracy." !d. at 720. Most commentators seem to have reached the
conclusion that Hughes did. See, e.g., Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 93 n.3 (3rd ed.,
1959) where the statement is made that "[t]he Washington text was objectionable by reason of provision that
submarine officers who broke the rule should be treated as pirates." See also irifra note 121.
99. One author calls attention to this by asserting that "the stipulation [in Article VI] dispels any
misapprehension that the instrument would be obligatory as between the nations which have ratified it."
Kenkichi Mori, supra note 66, at 118. But see supra note 93. In Mallison, supra note 41 at 43, the conclusion
is reached that "the submarine came out of the Washington Conference with undiminished status as a lawful
combatant."
100. Lawrence H. Douglas, The Submarine and tile Washington Conferetue oJ1921, 26 Nav. War CoIl. Rev.
86,92 (March-April 1974); reprinted in 62 International Law Studies 479, 488 (Richard B. Lillich &John N.
Moore, eds., 1980).
101. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 814,816; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 346.
102. Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War, 32 Am.J. Int'l. L. 2 (Supp.
1938); General Collection of the Laws and Customs ofWar819, 821 (M. Deltenre ed., 1943). In his testimony
before the International Military Tribunal after World War II, German Admiral Doenitz pointed out that
reference to this provision was contained in a footnote to the German Prize Ordinance. 13 T.M.W.C., supra
note 70, at 361. (Actually, it was in Article 39 (iii) of the Ordinance.)
103. In O'Connell, supra note 37, at 19, the author apparendy takes the position that using a ship's radio
to announce the appearance of a submarine and giving its location does not affect the ship's status as he calls
the decision to sink vessels winch follow that procedure a "dilution of Germany's standards" of submarine
warfare.
104. See supra note 81.
105. The International Military Tribunal paraphrased this provision by stating that "[i]fthe commander
cannot rescue, then under its [the 1936 Protocol's] terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow
it to pass harmless before his periscope." I T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression:
Opinion and Judgement 140 (1947) [hereinafter Nazi Conspiracy].
106. Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930, at 187-202 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 London
Conference].
107. ld. at 411.
108. ld. at 444.
109. ld. at 238.
110. See supra note 94.
111. In a criticism of these provisions (as reqffd in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol), one author has
written:
(T]he Protocol was much like an elegant carpet thrown over a littered and soiled passage, for it
attempted reform with one sweeping gesture, while what was called for was a thorough airing and
meticulous renovation of the laws governing submarine conduct. In essence the London Protocol was
the product of an idealistic era which trusted in glib moralizing to right past wrongs and prevent future
digressions.
Barnes supra note 14, at 189. However, another author takes the position that while the 1922 Washington
Conference was influenced by the "spirit of Versailles, " in the 1930 agreement "the tone of moral disapproval
is wanting." Hyman G. Rickover, supra note 13, at 1220 and 1221.
112. See supra text accompanying note 93.
113. 1930 London Conference, supra note 106, at 443. Both the 1922 and the 1930 provisions have been
properly criticized because "they attempt a regulation of submarine warfare without at the same time
considering the question of the armed merchantman; yet the two problems are intimately connected."
Rickover, supra note 13, at 1221.
114. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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115. See supra note 50.
116. Treaty on the Limitation of Annament (Second London Naval Treaty), signed at London, March
25, 1936,50 Stat. 1363; T.S. 919; 3 Bevans, supra note 50, at 257; 140 B.F.S.P. 243.
117. Documents of the London Naval Conference 1935, at 54 (1936) [hereinafter 1935 London
Conference). Prime Minister Baldwin's statement was confirmed by the French representative in his opening
address. Id. at 63.
118. !d. at 741-742 and 104.
119. !d. at 742-743. For a discussion in depth of the background of the 1935 London Naval Conference,
and its inevitable failure, see Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor (1974).
120. 140 B.F.S.P. 300, 302. It is believed that Hider did this as a political gesture and against the advice
of his naval advisers. It is, perhaps, appropriate to note that when World War II began, the United Kingdom
and France both took the position that these rules applied to aircraft as well as to surface warships and
submarines. 1 For. ReI. 547-48 (1939).
121. The Nyon Agreement, signed at Nyon, Switzerland, Sept 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 137; 33 Am. J.
Int'1. L. 550 (Supp. 1939); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 887. The Preamble stated that the submarine
attacks were "contraty to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be jusdy treated as acts of
piracy." Thus, although the 1922 Washington Treaty, supra note 93, had never become effective, its provisions
continued to be noted-and misinterpreted.
122. Antonio Cassese, TI,e Spanish Civil War and the Development qf Customary Law Concerning Internal
Anned Conflicts, Current Problems of International Law 287, 295-96 (A. Cassese ed., 1975).
123. League ofNations, OfficialJournal, December 1937, at 945-46; 33 Am.J. Int'1. L. 551 (Supp. 1939).
124. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 341. He also states that by the spring of1939 over 9,000 officers of
the British merchant marine had received instruction in gunnery and in convoy tactics. The statistics in 1
Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, at 22 (1954) [hereinafter Roskill) , disclose that by the end
of 1940 some 3,400 ships had been fitted with low-angle guns for protection against submarines and some
20,000 members of the Royal Navy had been trained to use these "defensive" armaments, as well as a large
number of the members of the merchant crews.
125. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 88-89. The British moved to the implementation of paragraph (b)
on 13 June, 1940. ld. at 90. It will be observed that the Handbook assumed that a merchant vessel had a right
to use its arms to resist visit and search and capture by an enemy warship-an action that Churchill had once
said a merchant vessel had no rights to take. See supra text accompanying note 65.
126. 1 William M. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade 113 (1952). On the other hand, it is reported
that until late in 1943 the primary objectives ofBritish submarines were the enemy's surface warships. I Roskill,
supra note 124, at 334. However, restrictions on attacks by British submarines on enemy merchant shipping
were rela.'l:ed in Norwegian waters in 1940, id. at 172, and were removed in the Mediterranean on February
5, 1941, id. at 439.
127. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days 35 (1959). For a discussion of the Batde of
the Adantic and of the convoy system, see Keegan, supra note 86, at 213-65.
128. See irifra text accompanying note 149, concerning the convoying of neutral merchant ships. See Frits
Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 139 (1971) where the following appears:
On the other hand, neutral merchant vessels on their way to or from Great Britain in this period
gradually took to sailing under the protection of the British navy and air force. Attacks on such escorted
vessels could not be considered unlawful; by the voluntary acceptance of direct armed protection of
one of the belligerents, the vessels in question assumed the character oflegitimate objectives for the
armed attacks of the other belligerent.
AJortiori, the same rule would apply to belligerent merchant vessels in convoy. Concerning neutral merchant
vessels in a convoy escorted by neutral warships, see Articles 61 and 62 of the 1909 Declaration of London,
supra note 22, which sets forth the customary rule in this respect. See also Article 64a, Harvard Research, supra
note 81, at 653 and Kyriakides v. Germany, 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribuneaux Arbitraux Mixtes 349,
summarized in the Harvard Research at 679. In S.S. Hall, Submarine Waifare, 5 Trans. Grot. Soc. 82, 89 (1920),
the author, a Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy, stated that merchantmen in convoys "appear to lose their
non-combatant standing" and that "from the day we [the British) adopted the convoy system the German
submarine campaign became legitimate."
129. Order in Council Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany, November 27,1939, Stat. R. &
0.1939, no. 1709. For a full discussion of the contents of this Order and its effect, see Frits Kalshoven, supra
note 128, at 118-19. For the reaction of the United States, see the U.S. note British Blockade ifGennan Exports,
1 Dep't St. Bull. 651 (No. 24, December 9, 1939).
130. See supra note 39.
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131. Cmd. 6191, 1940, at 5 (as quoted in Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 143). The preamble of the Order
in Council asserted violations by Germany of, among others, the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, supra
note 50. One expert in this field points out that at this stage German exports were Government controlled
and that probably the provision of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, supra note 39, did not apply "to the public
interests of the enemy State." Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 143. (A typographical error substituting "to" for
"not" in the original text was corrected by letter from the author, May 25, 1989.)
132. Kalshovcn, supra note 128, at 33.
133. 360 Pari. Deb., H.C., 5th Ser., colt 1351. (There has been considerable discussion as to whether
Churchill (and the International Military Tribunal) said, and meant, "night" or "sight'). See, eg., 10 Digest of
International Law 663-64 (M. Whiteman ed., 1968). The Parliamentary reporter recorded it as "night" which
in the context of the sentence, is much more logical than "sight": otherwise the sentence would read "all
German ships by day and all ships by sight").
134. "This order went far beyond anything contained in German orders, since it meant that in these waters
from then onward neutral ships sailing with full lights would also be sunk by British submarines." Doenitz,
supra note 127, at 59.
135. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note lOS, at 140.
136. German Prize Ordinance, August 28,1939, at 149 B.F.S.P. 663. After providing that ships in convoy
had no protection (Article 32), that forcible resistance could be overcome by force (Article 36), and that the
use of the wireless constituted assistance to the enemy (Article 39), the Ordinance stated, in Article 74:
(1) The destruction of vessels in accordance with articles 72 (enemy) and 73 (neutral) is only
permissible if the passengers, the crew and the ship's papers are placed in safety before destruction.
(2) The ship's boats are not deemed to be a place of safety unless under the prevailing conditions
of the sea and weather the safety of the passengers and the crew is assured by the proximity ofland or
by the presence of another vessel which is capable of taking them on board.
48. The contents of this article correspond to the London Rules of Submarine Warfare (printed
in the annex). (Note in original.)
The German Navy had proposed a "prohibited area" which would, in effect, have been a "free fire" zone
but this proposal was apparendy rejected at that time. 7 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,
at 546, Series D (1956).
137. 7 Fuehrer's Directive No.2, Documents on Gennan Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 548, Series D
(1956).
138. Fuehrer's Directive No.4, Fuehrer's Directives for the Conduct of the War 53,54 (1947). A British
historian asserts that these decisions "were not issued in any altruistic spirit but in the hope that after Poland
had been crushed, Britain and France-and especially the latter--would make peace. As soon as it was realised
that this hope was vain, removal of the restrictions on the methods of waging war at sea started." 1 Roskill,
supra note 124, at 103. He is undoubtedly correct.
139. 1 Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the Gennan Navy 9 (1947).
140. 8 Fuehrer's Directive No.5, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 176, 177, Series
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however, reasoning on these lines merely hides a breakdown of the law and the resumption by
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Dep't St. Bull. 454-55 (No. 19, November 4, 1939); 1939 International Law Situations, supra note 151, at
146. Germany urged other neutrals to designate a similar zone.
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other." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1108.
155. 13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 367. Later answers indicated that he was referring to the provisions
ofArticle 16 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles
of the Geneva Convention, siglled at The Hague, October 18,1907,36 Stat. 2371; 2 Am.J. Int'1. 1. 153
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The authors of two post-war studies of submarine warfare both recommend the affirmative legalization of
"war zones" or "operational zones." AlexA. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1109; and Barnes, supra note 14, at 197-98.
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161. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 4-12,1948, at 1072-73
(mimeo, n.d.) (hereinafter Judgment); 1 The Tokyo Judgment 412 (B.V.A. Roling & C.F. Ruter eds., 1977)
[hereinafter The Tokyo Judgment). It was definitely implemented by the Japanese. Judgment, 1073-74; The
Tokyo Judgment, supra.
162. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 139-40. Concerning the
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(3d ed., 1954); Gerald 1.A.D. Draper, Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities-the Laws of War and TIleir
Etiforcement, 18 Nav. War Coli. Rev. 22, 30 (November 1965), reprinted in 62 International Law Studies 247
(Richard B. Lillich &John Norton Moore eds., 1980); William T. Mallison,Jr., supra note 41, at 118-1221;
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172. Robert W. Tucker, supra note 148, at 66. In answer to interrogatories prepared by Doenitz's defense
counsel, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet at the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stated that on that date he had received a message ordering
unrestricted submarine warfare. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 108-11. This could, of course, also be
attributed to the nature of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
173. Japanese merchant ships acted very much the same as British merchant ships, being armed, reporting
submarine sightings, attempting to ram, etc. William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 89-90. This would
have justified unrestricted submarine warfare in the Pacific by the United States. However, it would not be a
justification for such action from the very first day of the war. Another author justifies the action of the United
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sightings, etc.), that there was no danger to neutrals (there were no neutral vessels in the Pacific), and that
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174. John Keegan, supra note 86, at 274-75. The final chapter of this book (266-75) contains a succinct
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War II.

